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Abstract. This article provides commentary on an essay written by Mr. Walt Jajko. Mr. Jajko’s essay was
itself a commentary on an article published in the book, Strategic Denial and Deception, the Twenty First
Century Challenge, that was edited by Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz and published by Transaction
Publishers (2002).
Mr. Jajko was formerly assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight and director,
Special Advisory Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within the United States
Government (USG).
Commentary.
Government Type. The very title fragment, “Conditions for Denial and Deception Success and Failure in
Democratic Regimes,” implies that there are structural, functional, and process differences between and
among governmental types that impact on the consequences of denial and deception programs. An
implicit hypothesis accompanying the above premise is that there are unique psychological effects on
political authorities (as denial and deception initiators, targets, and observers) from various
governmental types that have consequences for denial and deception success and failure. These effects
may most commonly be associated with (1) the very perception of threat against one’s government
regime from within and external to that regime; (2) thresholds of perceived threat bearing on the need
for action; (3) accepted modes of acting against threat, including the acceptability of engaging in denial
and deception; (4) expected consequences for political authorities contingent on denial and deception
success and failure; and (5) accepted life styles of political authorities and their representatives including
the prioritization of official, unofficial, and personal goals bearing on how time is acceptably fragmented
among these goals.
A broader variant of the premise of psychological differences between and among governmental types
encompasses the constructs of national and ethnic character. Do such constructs, as well as those
constrained to government type-induced psychological differences, bear some sort of ontological
validity? If not, are beliefs in such constructs associated with some sort of instrumental effectiveness or
even evolutionary adaptiveness? Unfortunately, common epistemological approached to knowledge,
reason, logic, faith, authority, and empiricism are accompanied by many epistemological vulnerabilities
and may not yield the certainty on which a prolegomenon or primer on denial and deception might be
founded.
(One further Issue as to the salience and import of government type for denial and deception may be
the non-psychological but equally significant hypothesis that the structure, function, and process of
government might only allow certain denial and deception initiatives to rise to the top for approval,
implementation, and evaluation, regardless of any concurrent and epiphenomenal psychological
consequences elicited by government type.)
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Characteristics of Deception Officers. Mr. Jajko’s commentary focuses on an assertion of another author
that deception officers may be more successful if they share a “single cohesive social class.” Mr. Jajko
asserts that there are more important characteristics associated with successful deception, viz., flexible
and imaginative minds intuiting options that conventional minds could not even conceive and the
understanding of how the enemy thinks.
As a point of departure, both Mr. Jajko and the author whom he critiques share a birds of a feather
perspective but differ in the nature of birds and feathers.
For example, a “single cohesive social class” has much to recommend it. One might posit that, for a
deception planning team, class identity attenuates disruptive behavioral differences, nurtures a sense of
unity of purpose and being on a team, and precludes demonization and ostracization of individuals who
present minority opinions. Moreover, class and class identity may be directly or indirectly correlated
with the very opportunities and experiences that are, in turn, correlated or even cause deception
success.
On the downside, class identity may preclude or minimize the testing of limits and the capability of going
and the motivation to go beyond the mundane. In fact, if class identity is associated with degrees of
access to material and other psychological and social benefits as perceived by all in a populace
represented or controlled by a government, constraints on options that risk one’s high standing or
mobility upward from a low standing as to possession of such benefits may ineluctably impede
deception success.
In contrast to class hypotheses, advocacy for flexibility, imagination, and intuiting of the uncommon
elicit significant face validity. Without seeking to be merely contrarian, however, one might find less
than what first meets the eye in such advocacy.
For example, cognitive flexibility and the like are at times conceived as primary symptoms of serious
psychiatric disorder even constituting variants of psychosis. It is the very flexibility and uncommonness
that land the bearer of such characteristics in a stigmatized and otherwise problematic position.
Even without approaching psychiatric status, one might still bear the brunt of stigmatization in the
groupwork of deception planning. This is because each individual within the group might well exhibit
flexibility and uncommonness in different ways. Some individuals would be closer in flexibility and
uncommonness to each other than other individuals. Majority and minority positions even on flexibility
and uncommonness would be experienced. The groupthink of groupwork would then work to
stigmatize the fruits of minority flexibility and uncommonness, much as majority inflexibility and
commonness in the larger world would stigmatize flexibility and uncommonness in general.
As to the positive value and desirability of understanding how the enemy thinks, one might counter with
several points.
First, one is limited to attempting to predict how the enemy behaves, because thinking is a privileged,
internal phenomenon that one might futilely infer about others in that these others may often enough
not even have conscious access to what they, indeed, think. Or even if one somehow acquires access to
enemy thought, such thought may not be linked with relevant enemy behavior.
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Second, the selection characteristic (for deception planners) of understanding how the enemy thinks is
less a characteristic than a consequence of characteristics. The usual suspects for such characteristics
include empathy and intuition. These characteristics are themselves characterized by multiple
definitions and measurement procedures and often enough are conflated with the consequence of
predicting behavior so as to form a circular sequence of causal attribution, e.g., possessing empathy
because the behavior one predicted occurred and predicting because of possessing the putative
characteristic of empathy.
Third, one might state that an enemy behavior will occur and it does, indeed, occur. However, the
appearance of the enemy behavior may not have been predicted at all but merely coincidental.
(Incidentally, this line of reasoning is similar to that of Sigmund Freud’s counter to the premise of
dreams predicting the future in The Interpretation of Dreams wherein a certain percentage of what is
dreamt should be expected to occur based on relevant behavioral base rates.
Thus, as with assertions concerning government types, those assertions addressing deception planners,
characteristics are still open to rigorous debate.
Deception and Values. Perhaps most importantly for the study of denial and deception is Mr. Jajko’s
analysis of values linked to each activity, especially deception. His analysis focuses on two classes of
values. The first embraces deception as often highly effective but morally and ethically suspect. The
moral and ethical taint may be deontological in nature, based on some intrinsic badness of deception
and human intention to engage in it. Such a taint should logically preclude any deception practice or
only allow it in exceptional cases. The moral and ethical taint also may be related to a variant of
postmodern and relativist critique through which most if not all threats are as equally valid or benign as
those from which we seek to protect, thus precluding the need to effect deception. Or the taint may
arise through the belief that deception is only for the weak and, thus, one can only engage in deception
if one is weak or believes one is weak, a belief that constrains the maintenance of political power among
the strong and those who believe themselves to be strong. As a praxis-based counter to all examples of
taint and to the whole class of values maligning deception, one should note that the same people who
decry political deception in matters affecting the collective good and even the life and death of the
collective engage in the individual politics of deception in matters affecting their own personal and
social lives.
The second class of values encompasses perceptions that deception is not effective or is unknowable as
to its effectiveness. Rationales for this class include the vast number of variables contributing to the
multi-determination of most behavior and the seeming impossibility of validly assessing all possible
contributing variables that might contribute or have contributed to behavior. Here the bureaucratic
psychology of deception planners may come into play. Desired enemy behavior that occurs is
associated with implemented deception plans, while undesirable enemy behavior that occurs would
have been worse without deception planning or has nothing to do with the deception plan.
Again, rigorous debate remains to inform on the appropriate value of denial and deception. Following
Nietzsche, to claim that there is no Universal Truth does not mean that there are no truths or that all
truths are equivalent.
Terror Management and Deception. Mr. Jajko makes a number of astute observations in describing the
problematics of deception as a tool of USG foreign policy. There are, indeed, few if any career pathways
for deception planners. The few planners attempting such a pathway often are looked at as culturally
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and even psychologically deviant. Deception activities do seem to require enormous intricacy as to
staffing and coordination. The long-term nature of strategic deception may well be fatally incompatible
with how political and military officers are rewarded and punished through promotions, awards, or the
lack thereof. It may well be easier to kill than to deceive, and killing or deterring/containing through the
threat of killing (the last, paradoxically, a valuable opportunity and permeable venue for deception
planning) has always been a sine qua non of strategic power and politics. There is a conceptual fuzziness
to the nature of counterintelligence and its linkage to deception-related constituents. Lip service to
deception in official security- and intelligence-related documents do far surpass praxis.
Yet a final observation concerning deception that is not made by Mr. Jajko may even be more important
than an analysis of deception and values. It may turn out that the very language we use to describe our
world may have no correspondence to the nature of the world. Instead there are competing narratives
about the world that relate to instrumental value and adaptiveness, not deception itself. As described
earlier in this article, the notion of competing narratives is not necessarily an argument for cognitive
relativism, because there may well be Truth, Good, and Right for each individual, not necessarily all
individuals. In fact, people may choose to believe as a means of avoiding the existential terror of openly
perceiving the world as potentially unknowable or unpredictable or meaningless. By this perspective,
belief in the viability of deception for political power may be the biggest deception of all. This should by
no means dissuade from believing in the value of denial and deception. It might, however, attenuate
internecine battles concerning the value of deception in the abstract or in managing the threat and
opportunity of political power through denial and deception for the security of what one believes to be
True, Good, and Right. (See Heinrich, C.U., & Borkenau, P. (1998). Deception and deception detection:
The role of cross-modal inconsistency. Journal of Personality, 66, 687-712; Jajko, W. (2002). Conditions
making for success and failures of denial and deception: Democratic Regimes. In R. Godson & J.J. Wirtz.
(Eds.). Strategic denial and deception, the Twenty First Century Challenge. Transaction Publishers;
Metcalfe, J. (1998). Cognitive optimism: Self-deception or memory-based processing heuristics?
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 100-110; Ratner, N. K., & Olver, R.R. (1998). Reading a tale
of deception, learning a theory of mind? Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 13, 219-239; Tuckett, A.
(1998). “Bending the truth:” professionals, narratives about lying and deception in nursing practice.
International Journal of Nursing Studies, 35, 292-302.) (Keywords: Deception, Denial, Jajko.)
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